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1 Introduction 
The “project” of European integration now finds itself at a historical juncture. The most 
extensive and daring enlargement has just been carried out, delivering the final blow to the 
cold-war  division which has plagued  the Continent for  the second half of the Twentieth 
Century,  and  bringing  in  a  variety  of  new  cultures,  languages  and  territories  under  the 
umbrella of the European Union. At the same time, Europe is deciding whether to codify its 
long cooperation by means of a formal constitution, signalling not only a major milestone in 
the peaceful integration of Europe but also an acknowledgement that the European Union is 
much  more  than  a  free-trade  agreement.  This  growing  self-identify  is  epitomized  in  the 
Lisbon strategy:  the  ambition and commitment to develop the EU  into the world’s most 
competitive knowledge-based economy. At the same time, the common agricultural policy 
(CAP) is undergoing a thorough revision, the rules for structural funds are being redefined 
and competition policy hotly debated.  
 
These  great  historical  developments  and  the  fundamental  choices  they  entail  cast  great 
uncertainty about the future of Europe. Because of this, no simple line can be extrapolated to 
predict  the  future.  Instead,  one  must  work  with  scenarios  that  allow  for  different ESRA Conference 2005  2  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
developmental pathways to be identified on the basis of specific policy choices, and their 
implications  worked  out.  This  contribution  provides  some  preliminary  results  of  a  pan-
European scenario study conducted in the framework of the ESPON programme along these 
lines. Although the project will result in the creation of integrated scenarios, for the purposes 
of this paper it is sufficient to confine the analysis to a specific theme — the economy — as 
this is one of the most pressing issues facing Europe at this time. In this context, two different 
policy scenarios will be presented on how to implement the Lisbon strategy based on two 
currently competing and divergent policy discourses. Afterwards, the paper will make some 
concluding remarks about the different spatial-economic effects, who the winners and losers 
are in each scenario, and identify some potential policy side-effects. 
 
2 The Lisbon imperative 
Despite the current uproar surrounding the ratification of the European Constitution and the 
potential accession of Turkey, the most urgent issue facing Europe today is the economy, or, 
more  specifically:  how  to  clamber  out  of  the  present  economic  malaise  and  “face  the 
challenge” of increasing global competition (Kok 2004). Governments have an important role 
to play in this: the economy may be generally determined by private sector forces, but it is 
also  greatly  affected  by  public  sector  decisions  like  whether  or  not  to  participate  in  a 
particular  common  market  (NAFTA,  EEC),  monetary  union  (euro)  or  other  regulatory 
framework  (WTO,  Kyoto  protocol,  services  directive).  Investment  in  strategic  sectors  — 
oftentimes  which  otherwise  would  not  be  profitable  —  can  also  produce  a  competitive 
advantage. 
 
At present, the main driving forces in the economy are globalization and the transition in 
advanced economies from an industrial to a post-industrial society. The former is manifested 
in  the  advent  of  worldwide  regulatory  bodies  such  as  the  WTO  and  the  increasing 
interdependency of the global marketplace whereas the latter is visible in the emergence of 
the “dot-com economy” and the creative class (Florida 2002). Bearing both of these structural 
developments  in  mind,  the  key  to  ensuring  prosperity  in  Europe  would  be  to  capture  a 
dominant position in this market. This is the reasoning behind the Lisbon strategy, which set 
as its goal for Europe to become in 2010 “the most competitive and most dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth, with more and better ESRA Conference 2005  3  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
and greater social cohesion” (EC 2000). Later, in Gothenburg, this strategy was extended to 
include environmental concerns as well.  
 
3 Implementing Lisbon  
The past five years have shown that putting the aspirations articulated in the Lisbon strategy 
into  action  is  far  easier  said  than  done  (Kok  2004).  One  reason  for  disappointing 
implementation lies in the fact that the EU commands relatively few financial resources to 
shift the course of the economy itself and must rely on considerable efforts at the member 
state level. The issue of whether member states have provided sufficient input will not be 
discussed further here however. Another reason, more relevant to the scenario study, relates 
to the fact that the EU does not have an economic development policy as such, but rather 
employs a package of sectoral policies with impacts on the economy to achieve its goals. 
Each one of these policy areas has however existed long before the Lisbon agenda and is only 
partly suited to the task at hand. This section will briefly sketch out the most important of 
these policy areas in terms of their goals, effects and current policy debates. Afterwards, the 
scenario  hypothesis  will  be  presented,  showing  how  the  Lisbon  strategy  could  be 
implemented by means of a coordinated policy package.  
Regional policy 
Regional policy is one of the oldest policy sectors of the EU. Although the aims of regional 
policy have changed over time, the primary objective has been to reduce regional disparities 
and stimulate employment in order to allow the different regions in Europe to compete on an 
equal footing in the common market. At present, it commands the second largest budget of 
the EU (after the agriculture) and issues subsidies in the form of co-financing for mainly 
infrastructure, land development and human resource development. It is difficult to quantify 
the physical impact of regional policy, due to a problem of isolating causality, but anecdotal 
evidence does seem to suggest an impact on governance — cross-border cooperation has 
become more common, as has attention for sustainable development (ESPON 2.2.2; Van 
Ravesteyn  and  Evers  2004).  A  positive  economic  development  of  recipients  is  generally 
acknowledged  (job  and  GDP  growth),  although  the  degree  to  which  regional  policy  is 
responsible for this remains the object of debate (Ederveen and Gorter 2002). Currently, the 
line set out for the next structural funds period (2007-2013) shows some more inclination to 
address  more  Lisbon-based  objectives  (Competitiveness  Objective).  In  addition,  pressure ESRA Conference 2005  4  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
from affluent member states to reduce budgets and increase effectiveness is also manifest, 
recently expressed by way of the resounding defeat of the latest EU Treaty (constitution) in 
referenda in France and the Netherlands. This may pave the way for employing the structural 
funds as a means to implement the Lisbon strategy. 
R&D policy 
European-level support for scientific research stems from a 1957 agreement to coordinate 
efforts in nuclear research, but only really got off the ground in the 1980s with the initiation 
of  the  Framework  Programmes.  FPs  seek  to  stimulate  economic  development  distorting 
competition by funding basic research and unprofitable yet useful (long term) knowledge 
activities. Generally universities and multinational corporations have profited from the FPs, 
and they have helped the EU its raise its level of R&D spending. However, as is painfully 
clear by the midterm review of the Lisbon strategy this is still lower than Europe’s main 
competitors.  Still,  one  must  be  careful  not  to  confound  R&D  efforts  with  the  larger 
knowledge-based economy; it is often forgotten that R&D is just part of the equation (Raspe 
et al 2004).
1 This fact is bound to bring with it tension in the Lisbon/FP nexus in the years to 
come. On the other hand, the FPs may also come under fire by competition policy, if they 
stray too far from supporting non-competitive basic research and attempt to directly push the 
Lisbon  goals.  In  any  case,  R&D  will  figure  prominently  in  any  scenario  of  Lisbon 
implementation. 
Competition policy 
The aim of EU competition policy is to help the internal market to function by ensuring that a 
level  playing  field  exists.  Main  activities  involve  reducing  state  aid,  liberalization  and 
privatization  of  state-owned  companies  and  regulating  mergers  to  prevent  monopoly 
formation. Currently, the liberalization of the services sector is on the agenda, which is highly 
relevant  for  the  Lisbon  strategy  since  the  knowledge-based  economy  is  largely  services 
related. The success of competition policy is linked to that of the common market where, 
between 1958 and 1972, trade between member states grew three times faster than outside 
(Ravesteyn and Evers 2004: 73). In  the process, however, competition policy  sometimes 
                                                 
1 According to the Commission, for example, “an increase in the share of R&D expenditures in GDP from 1.9% 
to 3% … would result in an increase of 1.7% in the level of GDP by 2010” (COM(2005)24, p. 29). As it is 
acknowledged that R&D is just one aspect of the knowledge economy, the activities of DG Research will be 
adapted to support other forms of innovative research as well. In fact, the Commission arrived at this conclusion 
as well: “by far the largest productivity effect comes from the absorption of the results of foreign R&D” (EC, ESRA Conference 2005  5  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
comes into conflict with other policy sectors. Both R&D policy and regional policy, which 
offer targeted subsides to businesses, walk a very fine line between serving community wide 
goals and offering state aid.  
 
In conclusion, these three policy fields— among others naturally, but for the purposes of 
expediency  only  these  have  been  selected  —  offer  some  tools  for  Lisbon.  Changes  in 
governance, embedding ideals of competition in the institutional framework at the local level 
can be achieved via regional policy. This can also be utilized to link strategic areas and jobs 
via  infrastructure  investments  and  training  programmes.  R&D  is  employed  as  direct 
stimulation, and competition to end unfair practices that hamper growth. As indicated, there 
is  also  a  very  delicate  balancing  act  between  concerns  of  regional  equality,  economic 
competitiveness and free trade in the main sectors relevant to the Lisbon strategy. 
 
4 Current policy debates  
The scenarios elaborated in this paper concern a specific issue: how to implement the Lisbon 
strategy. In order to improve the plausibility of the strategies of the policy decisions taken in 
the scenarios, the underlying logic has been borrowed from current policy debates. The first 
is a more “back to basics” approach currently favoured by the Commission following the 
midterm Lisbon review, while the other more “holistic” approach emerging from planners 
and geographers in the context of the ESDP. These will be discussed in turn. 
 
Midterm review: going back to basics 
In late 2004 the report of the High Level Group chaired by former Dutch prime minister Wim 
Kok on the progress towards Lisbon came to a predictable yet disappointing conclusion: 
Europe  still  had  a  long  way  to  go  to  meet  its  goals  to  become  the  most  competitive 
knowledge economy by 2010. Rather than admit defeat, the report stressed that implementing 
the Lisbon strategy is more urgent than ever: the problem will only intensify as time passes. 
Part of the problem was that too many additional policy aims were attached to the original 
Lisbon  strategy:  “Lisbon’s  overburdened  list  of  policy  objectives  has  obscured  the 
importance of these actions which can drive productivity growth” (European Commission 
                                                                                                                                                     
2004 European Competitiveness Report, p. 10), rather than being the source of this R&D. A similar conclusion 
was drawn empirically for the Netherlands by Raspe et al (2004). ESRA Conference 2005  6  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
2005: 13). In response, the report proposed that attention be drawn to the following (Kok 
2004: 6):  
·  The  knowledge  society:  increasing  Europe’s  attractiveness  for  researchers  and 
scientists,  making  R&D  a  top  priority  and  promoting  the  use  of  information  and 
communication technologies (ICTs); 
·  The  internal  market:  completion  of  the  internal  market  for  the  free  movement  of 
goods and capital, and urgent action to create a single market for services;  
·  The business climate: reducing the total administrative burden; improving the quality 
of  legislation;  facilitating  the  rapid  start-up  of  new  enterprises;  and  creating  an 
environment more supportive to businesses; 
·  The  labour  market:  rapid  delivery  on  the  recommendations  of  the  European 
Employment Taskforce; developing strategies for lifelong leaning and active ageing; 
and underpinning partnerships for growth and employment; 
·  Environmental sustainability: spreading eco-innovations and building leadership in 
eco-industry; pursuing policies which lead to long-term and sustained improvements 
in productivity through eco-efficiency. 
 
It is interesting to note that while the original Lisbon strategy called for “more and better and 
greater social cohesion” this concept is conspicuously absent from the recommendations.
2 
The  concept  of  sustainability  is  likewise  delegated  to  the  last  point  in  the  list,  and  is 
mentioned as a vehicle for economic growth rather than promoting sustainability in itself. 
Bluntly stated, the Kok report is a recipe for bolstering the strongest economic powers in the 
interest of creating maximum competition for Asia and the United States.  
 
Territorial cohesion: a spatial “third way” 
In 1999 and after about ten years of negotiations, ministers of planning from all the member 
states signed the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP). Although this is a non-
binding document (the EU still has no formal authority to engage in spatial planning) there 
existed broad political consensus regarding the prime objectives, particularly the concept of 
polycentricity.  The  aim  of  achieving  “sustainable  spatial  development”  —  not  so  very 
different from the wording of the Lisbon strategy to achieve “sustainable economic growth” 
                                                 
2 When the report does mention cohesion, it is in the context of competitiveness: “It [Lisbon] wants to embed 
Europe’s commitment to social cohesion and the environment in the core of the growth and jobs generation ESRA Conference 2005  7  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
— was elaborated in the ESDP in the following manner (Committee on Spatial Development 
1999: 10): 
·  Economic and social cohesion; 
·  Conservation of natural resources and cultural heritage; and 
·  A more balanced competitiveness of the European territory. 
 
Regarding the third point, the concept of polycentricity was used to strike a middle ground 
between concentration of economic activity and growth and fairness or equity. One of the 
spin-offs of the ESDP was the founding of the ESPON programme to investigate matters of 
polycentricity, urban-rural relationships and the like. Meanwhile, the concept of “territorial 
cohesion” was introduced into the constitution and championed by the Dutch and Luxemburg 
presidencies as a competency of the European Union.  
 
Although the ESDP and the Lisbon strategy relate to somewhat different issues, they both 
carry with them divergent normative ways of conceptualizing and realizing a certain future. 
For this reason, they have been selected as the philosophical groundwork for elaborating two 
of the four ESPON 3.2 scenarios on the European economy.  
 
5 A note on scenario selection 
The scenarios that were created in the context of ESPON 3.2 are of the prospective policy 
type. This means that the independent variable is EU policy. For this reason, much attention 
will be paid to the decision to adopt a particular kind of policy strategy, the various measures 
implemented to this end, and, finally, the impacts these may have on social and economic 
cohesion and spatial development. Because the intent is to examine the effects of different 
policy  directions,  as  many  ancillary  variables  will  held as  constant as  is  possible.  In  all 
scenarios it will therefore be assumed that globalisation, that is the ongoing intertwining of 
international networks and economic relationships, will continue to increase. In addition, the 
rise  of  the  knowledge,  information  or  creative-class  economy  will  also  be  assumed  to 
continue in each scenario. Finally, that the EU agricultural budget will continue to be reduced 
under  pressure  of  budgetary  constraints,  environmental  concerns  and  successive  WTO 
negotiations. 
                                                                                                                                                     
process so they are part of Europe’s competitive advantage … The wider macroeconomic framework, both the 
pursuit of monetary and fiscal policy, must be as supportive of growth as possible” (Kok 2004: 16). ESRA Conference 2005  8  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
 
The logic of the scenario selection is linked to that of the Lisbon strategy to become “the 
most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world” with “greater social 
cohesion.” Accordingly efficiency/competitiveness comprises one axis and equity/cohesion 
another, creating four distinct policy scenarios. These have been elaborated as follows. 
 
1.  High efficiency/competitiveness — low equity/cohesion (Best Foot Forward) 
2.  High efficiency/competitiveness — high equity/cohesion (EuroTigers) 
3.  Low  efficiency/competitiveness  —  low  equity/cohesion  (Balnibarbi  for  the 
Balnibarbians) 
4.  Low efficiency/competitiveness — high equity/cohesion (The Beaten track) 
 
Figure 1 Scenario overview  
 
Bearing in mind that the original idea behind the Lisbon strategy is economic growth rather 
than social cohesion and the environment, only two of the four economy scenarios will be 
worked out in detail, one where the “back to basics” approach described in the midterm 
review is dominant (best foot forward), and one which strives for growth in the context of 
“territorial cohesion” as understood in the ESDP (EuroTigers).
3 The presentation includes a 
short  recap  of  the  motivation  behind  the  scenario,  the  political  context,  and  the 
                                                 
3  The  Balnibari  scenario,  for  example,  is  less  interesting  because  it  involves  more  of  an  abandonment  of 
collective effort at the EU level with a reversion to national strategies, and “the beaten track” scenario sacrifices 
competitiveness for cohesion, which is both unlikely given the present political situation and against the main 
philosophy of the Lisbon strategy. 
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implementation strategy (limiting itself to the three policy areas discussed above, namely 
regional, R&D and competition).  
 
6 Scenario 1: Best foot forward 
As stated, the measures proposed in the midterm review of the Lisbon strategy (Kok 2004) 
comprise the points of departure for the “best foot forward” scenario: the knowledge society, 
the internal market, the business climate, the labour market and environmental sustainability. 
The main priority is to catch up with the US and the Far East with respect to competitiveness 
and  growth.  EU  investment  will  go  mainly  to  high-tech  and  competitive  sectors  of  the 
economy and be directed away from cohesion and agriculture.  
 
Political context 
The  stark  mismatch  between  the  bold  Lisbon  ambitions  and  sluggish  economic  growth 
comprise the backdrop of this scenario. The main countries behind the “best foot” philosophy 
include the United Kingdom, Austria, the Benelux, Sweden, and Finland — and particularly 
the business sector in these countries. Sympathisers but not overt proponents include France 
and Germany as both countries contain some elite regions, but also some clearly lagging ones 
as  well  (Britain,  despite  the  fact  it  clearly  has  lagging  regions,  also  has  a  more  liberal 
tradition  than  Continental  countries).  Countries  such  as  Italy  are  divided  on  the  issue, 
whereas Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece are opposed on economic and ideological terms 
(all have experienced the benefits of cohesion policy). Interestingly, the new member states 
join the “best foot” coalition, transcending narrow short-term gains, because it resembles a 
US-style strategy, which, more than the Western European model, is seen as preferable for 
achieving  economic  growth.  Moreover,  the  citizens  of  Europe  seem  convinced  of  its 
necessity:  according  to  the  2004  Eurobarometer  Report,  for  example,  “European  public 
opinion  is  ready  for  solutions  in  order  to  foster  growth  and  address  crucial  issues  like 
unemployment or the future of pensions” (European Communities 2005). Public opinion also 
shows that a “vast majority” believe that a knowledge-based society is the best way to deliver 
this, placing pressure on the European Parliament.  
 
Content of strategy 
The strategy entails massive injections of funds into technology development, education in 
hard sciences, support for ICT infrastructure and the like in order to bridge the investment ESRA Conference 2005  10  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
gap with Japan and the US in terms of per capita GDP (both public and private investments). 
The “best foot forward” is an intensely pro-EU strategy, as the European level will be relied 
on to deliver many of the changes via regulation and financial support. It is also emphatically 
Europhilic in nature as it wishes to champion the best aspects of Europe, allowing the EU to 
act as a beacon for the best minds on the globe. 
 
Since the ultimate goal is to attract, retain and put to use the world’s best human capital in the 
knowledge  economy,  additional  investments  will  be  required  to  enhance  the  quality  of 
facilities and amenities in Europe’s most competitive regions. This means that the European 
Union must “ensure that our universities can compete with the best in the world” (European 
Commission  2005:  9).  Specific  measures  include  the  creation  of  a  European  Institute  of 
Technology as mentioned in the midterm review (Kok 2004: 22). However, the “best foot 
forward” strategy goes further than this: funds are directed to disseminating an image of 
Europe’s elite universities as a unified alternative “ivy league” rather than an archipelago of 
excellence, as they are now commonly perceived. Educational credentials are standardised 
and streamlined throughout Europe, and rankings published regularly according to the “name, 
fame and shame” method. The most successful institutions rewarded with “EU top” status, 
entitling  them  to  additional  funding  and  other  benefits.  The  latter  include,  for  example, 
preferential treatment in land-use conflicts regarding physical expansion where the EU has 
jurisdiction (Natura2000, environmental standards, state aid), relaxations of immigration laws 
in  order  to  draw  top  professionals  and  students,  and  programmes  for  benefit  packages 
(subsidised travel and housing schemes) for students and staff. Additional funding would be 
earmarked towards research facilities and networking activities designed to attain spillovers. 
Sectoral implementation  
For each scenario, a short description will be provided of the way in which the three Lisbon-
oriented policy areas described earlier have been tailored to fit the chosen scenario strategy. 
 
Regional policy: in “best foot forward,” the Structural Funds will retain their importance, but 
will be employed strategically towards supporting initiatives that facilitate the creation and 
maintenance of elite regions. Funds to assist innovative firms in areas with dense knowledge 
networks are included in regional policy under the motto “linking innovative potential to 
geographical advantage”. With respect to allocation at the regional level, aid is linked to the ESRA Conference 2005  11  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
proven ability to fulfil the Lisbon objectives. Consequently, the regions receiving aid are 
displayed on the ESPON map below regarding past achievements (ESPON 2005: 29).  
 
Figure 2 Regionalised Lisbon performance: potentials for ‘Best foot forward’ ESRA Conference 2005  12  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
R&D policy: this is one of the most vital spearheads for the Lisbon strategy, and hence this 
scenario. Budgets of the Framework Programmes are increased dramatically, infused by links 
to the structural funds and CAP reductions (ESPON 2.1.2 2004), allowing the EU to meet and 
even exceed the R&D Lisbon targets of 3% of GDP. The theme of the previous Framework 
Programme (FP6: Information Society Research) will be carried on into the future in this 
scenario indefinitely. Funding for R&D will be awarded to proven ability to carry out the 
most advanced research in the world, and consequently is mainly directed to a select number 
of large multinational companies and universities. 
 
Competition policy: in “best foot forward” efforts are stepped up to make the Single Market 
more dynamic. This entails better coordination between regulatory and competition policies 
to encourage market access for new entrants and to introduce a more pro-active policy to 
support labour mobility. State-aid regulations  will  be  lifted for certain kinds  of industry, 
particularly  knowledge-intensive  small  business  start-ups.  This  was  already  the  thrust  of 
“Working  together  for  the  Lisbon  Strategy”  (European  Commission  2005:  8)  but  is 
intensified  in  the  “best  foot”  scenario.  On  the  other  hand,  state  aid  will  be  strongly 
discouraged if it interferes with or inhibits private-sector investment. The EU has to remain 
vigilant that promotion of elite organisations and sectors does not stifle healthy competition, 
and therefore existing anti-trust legislation and rules on public procurement remain vigorous. 
This scenario also calls for intensifying the freedom of movement of jobs, labour and capital 
in Europe, starting with the liberalization of the services sector. 
 
Hypothetical impacts 
Before discussing the spatial impacts of the scenario, a few words need to be said about the 
current territorial distribution of the economy. Europe displays a higher degree of regional 
economic differentiation than for example the United States. This will affect the prospects for 
implementing the Lisbon strategy as some regions are better positioned to compete in the 
global sphere and some are more likely to effectively translate public funding into increased 
competitiveness.  At  the  highest  level  of  scale  a  few  large  developmental  blocks  can  be 
identified which can be worked out into a few typologies. 
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·  Pentagon and periphery: this is to a large extent geographical, but there are certain 
regions within the Pentagon that exhibit peripheral characteristics (rural France) and 
some areas in the periphery that function as Pentagon regions (Southern Scandinavia). 
·  North/South divide: this is still visible, but some Southern (Mediterranean) regions are 
catching up partly due to sustained injections of structural funds; not as fast however 
as Ireland. 
·  East/West divide: during the cold war, this was the most important division in Europe. 
The markets opened in 1990 to foreign trade but this was managed on an ad hoc basis 
until  the  2004  EU  membership  guaranteed  free  trade.  These  member  states  are 
characterized by low GDP in absolute levels, but high growth in some areas. 
 
Since the central regions (Pentagon) are currently the main driving forces and carriers of Pan-
European growth and competitiveness, most of the investments are directed to these areas in 
“best  foot  forward.”  These  are  also  the  regions  with  the  highest  level  of  “creativity”  as 
understood  by  Florida  (2002).  EU  subsidies  will  therefore  be  provided  for  improved 
infrastructure  in  the  Pentagon  (to  counteract  congestion)  and  to  dynamic  companies  and 
organizations  engaged  in  the  knowledge  economy.  Information  and  resources  would  be 
pooled in order to construct a powerful MegaEuroRegion with the critical mass to attain and 
remain at the top of the world knowledge economy.  
 
Regarding the effects, while economic growth in Europe as a whole is expected to become 
more  dynamic  as  Europeans  begin  to  dominate  the  higher  echelons  of  the  knowledge 
economy,  this  will  be  accompanied  by  growing  regional  (but  not  necessary  national) 
disparities. Larger metropolitan areas with sufficient facilities will profit from the shifts in 
EU policy. At the same time, less populated regions will decline further, especially in the 
Eastern and Southern periphery. It is also likely to contribute to additional pressure on the 
existing transport infrastructure in the Pentagon, and will probably result in higher pollution, 
particularly  in  the  Randstad-Brussels  corridor  where  additional  economic  activity  is 
accompanied by a relaxation of some environmental standards. ESRA Conference 2005  14  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
 
7 EuroTigers 
With the subsequent enlargements the European Union became ever more heterogeneous; 
this was most pronounced in the 2004 enlargement. Heterogeneity poses, without doubt, a 
threat to community governance, but simultaneously it is an opportunity. If it wishes to retain 
its credibility, the European Union has to apply a more differentiated approach to countries 
and regions being in very different situations and at rather different development level. This 
is where a spatial approach has added value. Following the tenets of the ESDP, this scenario 
seeks  to  implement  the  Lisbon  strategy  using  strategic  territorial  indicators.  Rather  than 
concentrate funds on the existing elite as in “best foot forward”, these will be targeted to 
regions with growth potential in proportional terms spread throughout the Union: EuroTigers. 
The philosophy is that competitiveness does not necessarily have to come at the expense of 
cohesion. Like “best foot forward” the  most  lagging  regions  are largely “written off” as 
having little promise for improving the EU’s competitiveness.  
Political context 
The  midterm  review  of  the  Lisbon  strategy  is  published  a  few  months  after  the  2004 
enlargement, setting a tone of urgency for all member states. The “lack of commitment and 
political will” signalled in the report becomes a rallying call for banding together to ensure 
that Lisbon becomes a reality. In order to raise the necessary political support, a strategy is 
devised to unite old and new member states stressing the complementarity of competitiveness 
and cohesion. Ireland is held up as a “EuroTiger”, a shining example of successful use of 
structural funds, and a model for the new member states. Its progressive stance on intra-EU 
migration  is  also  praised.  The  idea  that  value-for-money  in  European  level  investment 
requires a strategic polycentric approach rapidly wins political ground in Lisbon as it did a 
decade ago for the ESDP.  
 
Content of strategy 
The essence of the EuroTiger strategy is to identify specific areas and sectors that hold the 
most promise for rapid and sustainable economic development. Unlike “best foot forward” 
these are not necessarily the elite. EuroTiger proponents view devoting resources to the best 
performing areas as conceptually flawed. On the one hand, they already have such formidable 
resources that any extra support provided by the EU would be very small in proportional ESRA Conference 2005  15  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
terms. Moreover, since these top-performers are already successful (by definition), they most 
likely  will  have  enough  momentum  to  remain  competitive  without  EU  assistance.  The 
EuroTiger  strategy,  in  contrast,  seeks  out  instances  where  the  EU  can  make  a  decisive 
contribution. The principle is akin to that of regional policy where funds are only given as a 
critical extra push for a project, rather than comprising a significant share of the total costs. 
Sectoral implementation  
As before, a short description will show how the three Lisbon-oriented policy areas described 
earlier have been tailored to fit the chosen scenario strategy. 
 
Regional policy: the tenets of the policy proposed in the Third Cohesion Report (2004) are 
largely consistent with the EuroTiger strategy, insofar that both competitiveness and cohesion 
are objectives. However, EuroTiger goes further in linking the two, taking full heed of the 
recommendation of ESPON 2.1.2 (2004) to facilitate coordinated implementation of regional 
and R&D policy. The same report has shown that R&D investments in less developed regions 
may deliver more value-for-money as the impact on accelerating the “catching up process” is 
greater. These investments would be aimed at allowing regions to realize their potential by 
means  of  providing  the  necessary  infrastructure  (transport  and  ICT).  Geographically,  the 
regions poised to receive the most Lisbon-based structural funds are those whose economy is 
best equipped to make the most of the investment towards Lisbon. These are not necessarily 
the best performing regions as in the previous scenario. The areas displayed in the map below 
(ESPON 2005: 19)  give some indication of which  regions  are potential EuroTigers.  The 
darker  colours  show  where  recent  growth  has  occurred,  and  the  various  MEGAs 
(Metropolitan Growth Areas) indicate areas where enough critical mass exists to take up 
funds to the end of stimulating the knowledge economy. 
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Figure 3 Main economic structures of the European territory: potentials for ‘Euro Tigers’ ESRA Conference 2005  17  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
R&D: like the previous approach this scenario provides for additional investment in R&D. 
However, more attention will be paid to supporting the most dynamic sectors and regions, 
rather than the strongest ones. With regard to the Framework Programme, an evaluation of 
FP6 showed that it was “almost impossible” for SMEs to participate in the “Networks of 
Excellence”  programme  and  that  it  was  particularly  difficult  for  newcomers  to  become 
partners (Marimon 2004). In EuroTigers, this problem is remedied with specific measures to 
ensure that new and smaller organisations also reap the benefits of EU R&D policy.  
 
Competition: as in “best foot forward”, internal market rules (including public procurement) 
are rigorously applied as the development of new markets necessitates unobstructed flow of 
capital and labour. Markets must not be distorted with national state aid (usually to failing 
industry), but instead aid must be given at a EU level with the goal of acting as a catalyst to 
allow promising new businesses to gain their footing. 
 
Hypothetical impacts 
Like in spatial development, the motto is that polycentricity constitutes the golden mean 
between  equity/welfare  and  efficiency/redistribution.  This  has  the  clear  advantage  of 
broadening  the  base  of  political  support  for  the  strategy,  seen  as  a  prerequisite  for  the 
implementation of the Lisbon strategy (European Commission 2005: 12). 
 
This scenario envisions the implementation of the Lisbon strategy as formulated in 2004, 
with reference to cohesion and sustainability. There is an obvious link to be made between 
these economic ambitions and the three-pronged strategy of the ESDP regarding sustainable 
spatial development. For this reason, the concept of polycentricity is well adapted to the 
EuroTigers strategy. The outcome of the scenario is slightly higher total GDP growth than the 
“best foot forward” scenario and considerably higher growth than the next two scenarios. 
This is because of improved effectiveness of stimuli. The effect on territorial cohesion will 
also differ from the previous scenario. Here, it is expected to increase at the macro level 
(rather than decrease) but decrease at the meso level. 
 
8 Conclusions 
The two scenarios represent extreme variations of how to implement the Lisbon strategy, 
derived from current policy discussions and linked to a logical framework. It is doubtful that ESRA Conference 2005  18  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
one or the other scenario will become a reality, and that Lisbon implementation is more likely 
to incorporate a mix of both strategies. In addition, now that we are looking to the actual 
future,  attention  should  also  be  drawn  to  the  two  ESPON  3.2  scenarios  that  were  not 
addressed in the paper (both of which entail the lack of Lisbon implementation) because they 
too have probabilistic elements. The “Balnibari” scenario, where the importance of the EU as 
a whole diminishes suddenly became more plausible following the results of referenda on the 
European Constitution this summer. Regarding the other “beaten track” scenario, the notion 
of “cohesion” is still very central in European politics, and the budget of Objective 1 of the 
structural funds still eclipses that of R&D. Moreover, a winning coalition of new member 
states and previous net-recipients is also conceivable to push through such a strategy. So, this 
word  of  caution  should  be  borne  in  mind  when  considering  the  results  of  the  scenario 
exercise on Lisbon implementation. 
 
Some interesting points arise when “best foot forward” is compared to “EuroTigers” in terms 
of economy, ecology, society and geography. “Best foot forward” seemed to make a more 
convincing case when it came to realizing the best knowledge-based economy, but then for a 
rather select few. If there is little spin-off, this could still be a suboptimal model in terms of 
total economic growth. This raises a fundamental question: is Lisbon successful if Europe has 
the best R&D and/or creative class for a narrow elite, or is it preferable for Europe to be more 
competitive as a whole in the new economy? In any case, it is rather safe to say that “Best 
foot forward” would create more inequality, not only socio-economically, but geographically 
as  well:  the  core  of  Europe  would  prosper  and  the  periphery  would  be  neglected.  This 
problem was resolved in EuroTigers: polycentric development would entail that every corner 
of  Europe  would  have  at  least  one  major  growth  centre.  If  the  strategy  delivers  what  it 
promises, there would be even more economic growth than in “Best foot forward” since the 
funding would be used more efficiently: as a catalyst, and not as fuel. This fact, in itself, 




Finally,  neither  scenario  seems  to  be  definitively  preferable  in  terms  of  the environment 
either. Whereas the first would probably produce higher levels of concentration of pollution, 
                                                 
4 On the other hand, of course, the criteria for gaining funding in EuroTigers are necessarily more complex, and 
therefore more susceptible to political manipulation and corruption (even the relatively straightforward cohesion ESRA Conference 2005  19  Dammers, Evers and de Vries 
the longer distances between growth centres in “EuroTigers” could compensate for this. This 
leads us to the rather dubious conclusion that the strategy based on the ESDP — where 
sustainable  development  is  a  guiding  principle  —  could  conceivably  be  the  more 
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